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"[Tihe problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the
color-line. "
W.E.B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk'
"'You are misinterpreting the facts of the case,' said the priest.
'The verdict is not suddenly arrived at, the proceedings only
gradually merge into the verdict. '
2
Franz Kafka, The Trial
I. INTRODUCTION
Brown v. Board of Education was at once the twentieth century's
pivotal judicial event and the Warren Court's paradigm decision.3 The
Supreme Court held that public schools segregated by race violated
minority students' rights protected by the Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause. This Article will analyze the remedies doctrines the Court
developed following Brown. Its major goal is to describe, briefly, for a
contemporary audience the Court's injunction remedies to vindicate
plaintiffs' rights under the Brown decision.
The Article has an additional goal. The professional debates about the
boundary between a person's constitutional right and her remedy, the
role of the judge's discretion in drafting and administering an injunction,
the relationship between the defendant's violation and the injunction,
and the legitimacy of courts' large scale or "structural" injunctions are
overarching themes below. These professional debates began immediately
after Brown and continue today; indeed in 2003, two important scholarly
books were published making those discussions contemporary.4 This
1.

2.
3.
4.

W.E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK vii (1903).
FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 264 (English translation 1956).

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
OWEN FISS, THE LAW AS IT COULD BE (2003); Ross SANDLER & DAVID

SCHOENBROD,

DEMOCRACY

BY

DECREE:

WHAT

HAPPENS

WHEN

COURTS

RUN

GOVERNMENT (2003). In order to provide full disclosure, the Author notes that he has
published a casebook with Professor Fiss, OWEN M. FIss & DOUG RENDLEMAN,
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Article's additional goal is to contribute to that professional debate by
clarifying the distinction between right and remedy in a structural
injunction, defining and discussing separate remedies principles for a
constitutional injunction, and describing the way remedies principles
channel the judge's discretion.
The background for Brown encompasses the toxic heritage of chattel
slavery, the later failure of Reconstruction after the Civil War, and the
unjust Jim Crow system of segregation under positive law that followed.
It also includes the ugly heritage of explicit racial prejudice and tension
just beneath the surface even today. Persistent legacies of this history
are the unequal educational opportunities and economic disparities that
continue to haunt the nation.
The Supreme Court based Brown on legal and social trends that had
been evolving for some time.5 Although state and local governments in
Southern and some border states required racially segregated public
education, at mid-century, legally mandated segregation was isolated
morally and rested on an unsteady legal foundation. Inconsistent all
along with the core democratic and equality values of the Declaration of
Independence and the Reconstruction amendments to the Constitution,
official segregation was insupportable in light of the United States'
recent defeat of the Nazi
6 German dictatorship and the repudiation of its
explicit racist ideology.
Several things, however, militated against a precipitous legal death
sentence for state-mandated segregation.
The status quo of white
supremacy was buttressed by the ideologies of individualism, property
owners' rights, states' rights, and a limited federal government role in
state and local government functions. To many conservative lawyers, the
Court's nineteenth century decision in Plessy v. Ferguson was a stable
INJUNCTIONS (2d ed. 1984), and is sympathetic with most (but not all) of his positions.
5.
Allan Ides, Tangled Up in Brown, 47 How. L.J. 3 (2003); WILLIAM H.
HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS 496-97 (1973).
6.
See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 450 (2004) ("By 1954, segregation

seemed like such an egregious evil... that the justices simply could not make
themselves sustain it."); Neal Devins, What Brown Teaches Us About the Rehnquist
Court's Federalism Revival, 37 PS POL. SCI. & POL. 211 (2004), available at
http://www.apsanet.org/PS/apri104/devins.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004) (arguing that
social and political forces were crucial factors in the Brown Court's decision).

7.

See Genna Rae McNeil, Before Brown: Reflections on HistoricalContext and

Vision, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1432-54 (2003) (giving a short history of the legal and
social struggle leading up to Brown).
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and dependable constitutional underpinning that buttressed segregated
public schools.8 Finally, in the period following the New Deal, the
Supreme Court was inclined to eschew a vigorous role in setting social
policy directions.
The Brown Court's specific holding was that "in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place." 9 The decision
doomed the Southern way of life of racial segregation required by
positive law. The Court's principle, interdicting public school segregation,
developed into a broadly generative constitutional rule that official
segregation by any level of government violates a minority group
member's right to equal protection of the law. This broad rationale
spawned a judicial "Second Reconstruction" which ended the notion that
United States law would recognize two kinds of people and two kinds of
public services.l°
After addressing what courts and legal scholars mean by "remedy" in
Part II, this Article will develop school desegregation plaintiffs'
remedies in aid of the Brown Court's specific holding. It will progress
in three stages: Part III-Brown II and "All Deliberate Speed." Part
IV-Green and "Now." Part V-The Court's "Unitary" Exit Strategy.
Having summarized the way courts defined the plaintiffs' constitutional
right to desegregated education, developed injunctions to implement
their right, and began to withdraw from adjudication, the Article
resolves, however, in Part VI, that courts' roles in school desegregation
lawsuits are likely to persist at least in the near future. For anyone who
has not already figured it out by then, my answer to the question in the
title will be in the conclusion.
II. REMEDY
After a court decides that the defendant has violated a plaintiffs right
protected by the governing substantive law, it begins to analyze the
plaintiffs remedy. A remedy, as this Article defines it, is what a court
orders at the end of a lawsuit on behalf of a successful plaintiff. The
court will endeavor to frame a solution for the plaintiff that will
transform her reality to correspond with the substantive law.
8. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown I, 347 U.S. 483
(1954); see HARBAUGH, supra note 5, at 492 (summarizing the reasons South Carolina's
lawyer, John W. Davis, felt confident of victory in Brown).
9. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
10. FiSs, supra note 4, at 244; see also Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
After a trial judge held Ford Johnson in contempt for sitting in the "white" seating

section in a courtroom in Richmond, the Supreme Court reversed in a decision that
confirmed the overarching point that state-required race segregation of a public facility
violated the Constitution. Id. at 62.
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In plaintiffs' school desegregation lawsuits, the courts decided that the
United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause outranked state
statutes and other positive law that called for racial segregation. The
desegregation plaintiffs' judicial remedy is an injunction-a court order
telling the defendant to do something or to refrain from doing something."
The judge grants an injunction to compel the defendant to end the
violation and to deliver the practical effect of the substantive decision to
the plaintiffs. For the plaintiffs, while the court's substantive decision
states the abstract law, the court's injunctive remedy is a salutary
practical fact.
To formulate the plaintiffs' injunction, the judge, aided by the
adversaries, pursues several inquiries. Defendant's violation of the

11.
In this Article and in all constitutional litigation in federal court where
plaintiffs are seeking an "equitable" injunction remedy, the federal judge will find the
facts, apply the substantive rule, and formulate the injunction without a jury.
School desegregation plaintiffs eschewed any "legal" remedy, recovery of
compensatory money damages. In the early 1950s, the Court had not developed the
qualified immunities that protect an official administering in good faith an
unconstitutional program. However, the defendants' Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial in "Suits at common law" may have been one reason for desegregation plaintiffs in
the Deep South in the 1950s to spurn damages. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
In an email responding to an earlier draft of this Article, Professor Allan Ides
speculated about damages. "I wonder whether a damages remedy would have sped the
process along-including personal damages against those executive officers who,
without reasonable good faith, attempted to obstruct the student's ability to attend
schools regardless of race. The states and local communities then become the monitors
of their own process with the stick of damages hanging over their head." Email from
Allan Ides, William M. Raines Fellow, Loyola Law School, to Doug Rendleman, Robert
E.R. Huntley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law (Mar. 24,
2004) (on file with author).
Moreover, when the constitutional plaintiffs are seeking an injunction or other
equitable remedy, the judge encounters the irreparable injury rule; phantom or not, the
"rule" is that the judge will deny plaintiffs' request for an injunction unless plaintiffs
show that, without the injunction, their legal remedy will be inadequate, and that they
will be irreparably injured. Plaintiffs' irreparable injury from unconstitutional official
race discrimination is palpable, straightforward, and virtually uncontested.
Doug
Rendleman, IrreparabilityResurrected?: Does a Recalibrated Irreparable Injury Rule
Threaten the Warren Court's Establishment Clause Legacy?, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1343, 1380-83 (2002).
The school desegregation plaintiffs did not seek another form of equitable relief, the
judge's appointment of a receiver to operate the defendant school district. See 1 DAN B.
DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 30 (2d ed. 1993)
(explaining that a court could enforce integration of a school by appointing a receiver to
manage it and displacing the school board and administrators).
Finally, in this Article, "Plaintiffs" is plural because school desegregation lawsuits are
and were plaintiff class actions.
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plaintiffs' rights under substantive law relegated them to a second-best
world and prevented them from enjoying a better world. After being
satisfied that the defendant breached the plaintiffs' right, the judge
inquires into the plaintiffs' actual situation. What comprises their real,
but second-best, world? The judge next fashions a counterfactual world:
what would the plaintiffs' actual "better world" have been if the defendant
had obeyed the substantive standard? The judge, finally, decides how to
formulate an injunction to move the plaintiffs from their actual but
second-best condition to the better world the defendant's breach prevented.
By granting an injunction the judge seeks to transform the plaintiffs' reality
to correspond with their substantive right.
A reader of courts' decisions and professors' articles will not always
discern the straightforward distinction between the plaintiffs' substantive
constitutional right and the judge's injunction remedy outlined in the
preceding paragraph. Although this Article endeavors to clarify what is
meant by remedy and to outline the remedial inquiry, many judges and
scholars define plaintiffs' substantive rights and their remedy differently
or, perhaps, do not define them at all. Definitions of right and remedy
are elusive; the distinctions between them are unstable; and definitions
and distinctions from one setting may, but usually should not, carry over
to another setting. One reason for this muddle is the murky relationship
between the right-remedy distinction and judicial discretion; this
distinction will be treated below after discussing some views about right
and remedy.
The Supreme Court's majority opinions have defined school desegregation
plaintiffs' substantive constitutional rights imprecisely. This imprecision,
according to David Kirp, a leading scholar of education law, has led
courts to a reasoning process "which defines the wrong by inspecting
what is required by way of remedy.... Wrong defines remedy, which
in turn redefines wrong." The result according to Kirp? A "decisionmaking strategy," not a way of solving a problem.12
The late Professor Abram Chayes, a notable scholar of constitutional
injunctions, described the right-remedy distinction. The Brown Court,
Chayes wrote, established students' "right" to attend a desegregated
school system.' 3 A judge cannot reason directly from the students' "right"
to their injunctive remedy, to discern "the content of the decree in any
particular case."' 14 The Brown Court "did not establish a particular
structure or methodology for eliminating segregation in the schools, but
12.

DAVID

L.

KIRP, JUST SCHOOLS: THE IDEA OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN

EDUCATION 52 (1982).
Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
13.
HARV. L. REV. 4, 50-51 (1982).

14.

Id.at 50.
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instead mandated an effort for wide-ranging systemic reform-in the
first instance by school authorities and, failing that, by the courts."' 5
Moreover, according to Chayes, a judge cannot
"work backward from
'6
the relief to define the contours of the right.'
Professor Chayes maintained that uncoupling the plaintiffs' right from
their remedy augmented the judge's discretion in formulating the
injunction's terms. Although the plaintiffs' right is closely linked to
their remedy in what he identified as "the classical litigation model,"' 7 in
framing "prospective and affirmative" constitutional injunctions, however,
the judge's "discretionary component is dramatically enhanced."' 8 "This
[judicial] discretion makes it impossible to identify a unique remedial
regime that follows ineluctably from and is measured by the [judge's]
'' 9
determination of [the defendant's] substantive liability."
A reader-critic may gasp at Chayes's leap from the defendant's
substantive violation to the plaintiffs' injunction and the surfeit of
discretion he endowed on the judge. In short, a hypothetical reader-critic
may decry Chayes's audacity in unbridling a judge to make up plaintiffs'
injunctions as the lawsuit goes along. This contemporary reader-critic
gasps in the best tradition of seventeenth-century commentator John
Seldon, who joked about "roguish" equity and focused on the menace of
subjective, ruleless decisionmaking. 20 Suppose, Seldon wrote, the law
"should make the standard for the measure we call a foot to be the
Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure would this be; One
Chancellor
has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent
21
foot.",

More positivistic judges and scholars seek techniques and principles
of confinement to contain the judge's discretion within predictable walls.
In his Blackstone Lecture at Pembroke College, Oxford, the late Regius
Professor Peter Birks maintained that a court's use of the concept of a
plaintiffs remedy, as separate from her substantive right, erodes
predictability and fosters a poisonous pattern of destabilized judicial
decisionmaking that he named "discretionary remedialism." "This is a
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
at 51.
Id.
at 50.
Id.
at 45.
Id.
at 46.
Id.

JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN

1927) (1689).

21.

43 (Sir Frederick Pollock ed.,

Id.
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nightmare trying to be a noble dream. The core of discretionary
remedialism is the separation of liability and remedy. Liability triggers
the courts' discretion in the matter of the remedy., 22 A court might cure
this malady of "remedialists [doing] their best to dissolve the law in
pools of misdirected good intentions," Birks concluded, by "preferring
the language of rights," and downgrading or abolishing the concept of
"remedy" as distinct from "right. 23
This Article's treatment of plaintiffs' right and remedy is both more
channeled and positivist than Chayes's and more nuanced and functional
than Birks's. It first distinguishes plaintiffs' right and remedy along the
lines of principle, rule, and remedy. Principle is the most abstract level
of generalization in a court's decision. Here the reader may think of the
constitutional language.
The second and more specific level of articulation is the substantive
rule which defines the plaintiffs' substantive right. Court decisions that
give meaning to a constitutional provision's values and principles often
comprise the source of these rules. Then, in a lawsuit, the court finds
that the defendant has violated plaintiffs' rights as defined by the
constitutional provision and earlier decisions. The judge's remedy is the
solution; it is the order the judge formulates to change the plaintiffs
situation in the world to achieve her right. "Rights," as Professor Owen
Fiss phrased the distinction between right and remedy, "operate in the
realm of abstraction, remedies in the world of practical reality ....
A
remedy is more specific, more concrete, and more coercive than 24the
mere declaration of right; it constitutes the actualization of the right.,
This Article builds on my proposition that a court's substantive
constitutional decision differs from its constitutional injunction. 25 The
priest in Kafka's The Trial might have been describing the present-day
judge's analytical segue from right to remedy. The desegregation
lawsuit's substantive "proceedings only gradually merge" into the plaintiffs'
practical reality in an injunction. 26 Despite the difficulty of distinguishing,
each stage of school desegregation below displays remedies principles
discrete from substantive rules.
22.

Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23

23.

Id. at 36-37.

(2000).

24. Fiss, supra note 4, at 44.
25.
See also Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibriation,
99 COLUM. L. REv. 857 (1999).

26. KAFKA, supra note 2, at 264. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
DestabilizationRights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1015,
1042 (2004) (writing about prison injunctions, the authors observe that "[o]nce liability
is found, the process of proof merges with that of implementation: a major focus of
implementation is the continuous measurement of compliance").
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The judge needs discrete remedies standards to implement a substantive
right. The judge's standards for remedy include, nevertheless, the core
idea that the plaintiffs' remedy ought to advance the substantive principle
and rule.27 A judge with discretion to select the terms of the plaintiffs'
injunction formulates it separately from deciding their right, but with
their right always in view. 28 The Brown I Court'S 29 substantive decision
that segregated public education violated the plaintiffs' rights under the
Equal Protection Clause differs from its delayed remedial opinion in
Brown 1130 charting the Court's goals to implement a remedy for the

students, the subject this Article turns to next. The courts' separate remedial
standards for school desegregation injunctions developed, improved, and
dwindled during the phases that followed.

III. BRowNIIAND "ALL DELIBERATE SPEED"
In 1955, the plaintiffs' adjudicated equal protection deficit was already
'31
more than a year old. After that "fifty-four-week cooling-off period,
the Court, following rebriefing and reargument, promulgated Brown II,
its remedies decision. Because of its significance for this Article, four
paragraphs follow:
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of
varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility
for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to
consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith
implementation of the governing constitutional principles. Because of their
proximity to local conditions and the possible need for further hearings, the
courts which originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial
27.

DOBBS, supra note 11, at 27; FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A

PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE

(1991).
28. Other helpful discussions of right-remedy include Wendy Parker, The Supreme
Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475
(1999) [hereinafter Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies]; Wendy
Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation,and Federalism, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1691, 1737 n.247 (2004) [hereinafter Parker, Connecting the Dots];
Susan Poser, Termination of DesegregationDecrees and the Elusive Meaning of Unitary
Status, 81 NEB. L. REV. 283, 285 (2002); Tracy Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The
Fundamental Right to a Remedy, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1636-40 (2004) (arguing
that successful plaintiffs' right to a remedy is a fundamental one protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Rendleman, supra note 11, at 1353-55.
29. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I1).
31.
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 716 (1975).
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appraisal. Accordingly, we believe it appropriate to remand the cases to
those courts.
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by
equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a
practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting
and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise
of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal
interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as
practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest may
call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to
school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set
forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly take
into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a
systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the
vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply
because of disagreement with them.
While giving weight to these public and private considerations, the courts
will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward
full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been
made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the
ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to
establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent
with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the
courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the
physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system,
personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact
units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on
a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be
necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will also consider the
adequacy of any plans the defendants may propose to meet these problems
and to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system.
During this period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these
cases.
The judgments below ... are accordingly reversed and the cases are
remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such
orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper
to admit to public schools on a racially 32nondiscriminatory basis with all
deliberate speed the parties to these cases.

The Brown II Court expressed several remedial guidelines. 33 The
plaintiffs' ability to enjoy their constitutional rights is critical; nevertheless,
theirs is not the only interest in play. First was the Court's novel
proposition that the defendants, the school authorities who lost the lawsuit,
have the "primary responsibility" for resolving the constitutional incongruity.
The Court put the proverbial fox in charge of desegregating the
plaintiffs' schoolhouse.
The second responsibility, the trial judges', was consistent with the
32. Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 299-301 (citations omitted).
33. The material in this Part is a summary of complex developments. For a fuller
treatment, see Parker, Connecting the Dots, supra note 28, at 1706-16; J. HARVIE
WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION:
1954-1978, at 61-102 (1979).
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foregoing. It dealt with timing. Although a decree admitting the
plaintiff-students had been suggested, the Court rejected a fixed date or a
planned schedule.34 Indeed, at the oral argument in what would turn out
to be an optimistic prediction, Thurgood Marshall had addressed timing;
he could conceive
of nothing administrative-wise that would take longer than a year.... I submit
that a longer period of time would get the lower court into the legislative
field ....
...I am a firm believer that, especially insofar as the federal courts are
ends with telling the state, in this field
concerned, their duty and responsibility
35
at least, what you can't do.

The Court did not order an immediate injunction. Instead it initiated a
transition period by telling the trial judges to retain jurisdiction over the
lawsuits until the plaintiffs' rights were implemented.
Almost as if it were responding to Thurgood Marshall's argument,
quoted above, the Court mentioned, alluded to, or reminded the trial judges
of three related but separate remedial countervailing considerations that
militated against the plaintiffs' immediate enjoyment of their constitutional
rights: First, because of separation of powers, a judge's injunctive task
will involve the delicate and then unfamiliar task of supervising
executive and administrative decisionmaking.36 Second, under principles of
federalism, a United States judge drafting and administering an injunction to
desegregate a school will thrust himself into an unfamiliar territory, the
heart of a state and local government function.37 Third, the transition's
logistics, the actual job of building the plaintiffs' path to their constitutional
right, will compel the judge to devise and grant an injunction that will

34. KLUGER, supra note 31, at 737, 742-45.
35. Rebuttal Argument of Thurgood Marshall, Esq., on Behalf of Appellants,
Harry Briggs, Jr., et al., at 14-15, Briggs v. Elliott, No. 101, before the United States
Supreme Court (Dec. 8, 1953), available at www.lib.umich.edu/exhibits/brownarchive/
oral/ReargumentBriggs.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2004); see also KLUGER, supra note 31,
at 707 (noting that Chief Justice Earl Warren's concluding paragraph in Brown I, setting
further oral argument to formulate decrees because of the "considerable complexity" and
"wide applicability" of these class-action cases, showed his dexterous use of power and
compromise).
36. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300-01 (stating that in deciding whether defendants are
in good faith compliance with Brown I, "the courts may consider [various] problems
related to administration ... and revision of local laws and regulations which may be
necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will also consider the adequacy of
").
any plans the defendants may propose to meet these problems ....
37. Id. at 299 ("Full implementation of [Brown !'s] constitutional principles may
require solution of varied local school problems.").
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alter a cumbersome educational bureaucracy's trajectory from an
unconstitutional to a constitutional one.38
The Court's countervailing remedial considerations qualified the
plaintiffs' substantive rights by saying explicitly that other things may
come first-sometimes the court's injunction will fall short of correcting
the defendant's violations immediately. 39 The Court augmented the
year's delay, the school authorities' responsibility, the courts' retained
jurisdiction, and the countervailing considerations with the ominous
oxymoronic phrase, originally suggested by Justice Frankfurter, that the
transition from segregated to constitutional schools was to occur with
"all deliberate speed."40 "All deliberate speed" by itself emphasized that
the judge's injunction would be tardy.
A court will often resort to something like "all deliberate speed" under
an unwritten remedial principle called "let the loser down easy," more
felicitously known as "transitional jurisprudence." An analogy comes
from post-Apartheid South Africa. A discriminatory practice persisted
after the democratic elections in 1994: African children walked to school,
while white children rode to school in subsidized buses. Responding
to public pressure, the new minister decided in the middle of the second
school term that the subsidies had to stop. The school principals argued,
however, that the decisionmaker had not followed proper procedure and
that the sudden termination was unfair and would disrupt the children's
schooling. The court upheld the principals' contention. Although the
unjust subsidies had to cease, "this had to be done in an orderly and
reasonable fashion with fair procedures." The court ordered that the
subsidies would continue until the end of the school year. 4' If judicial
compromises for logistics are an inevitable part of a transition, the
remedial process becomes a series of pragmatic judgments. How much
delay and amelioration is too much-and what principles guide it?
The Supreme Court's guidance was delphic. In school desegregation,
the trial judge would, the Court maintained, employ traditional equitable
principles, including that hallmark of chancery, copious discretion.
"Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district
court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and
38. Id. at 300 ("To effectuate [plaintiffs' interest in nondiscriminatory admission
to public schools as soon as practicable] may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles
in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional
principles set forth in [Brown I].").
39. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 585-90 nn.712 (1983) (collecting cases).
40.

KLUGER, supra note 31, at 742-44.

41. Premier, Mpumalanga v. Ass'n of State-Aided Sch., 1999 (2) SALR 91 (CC);
see A.L. Sachs, The ChallengesofPost-ApartheidSouth Afica, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 63, 66 (2003).

1586
HeinOnline -- 41 San Diego L. Rev. 1586 2004

[VOL. 41: 1575, 2004]

Brown II's "All DeliberateSpeed" at Fifty
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies. 4 2
One countervailing consideration that the Supreme Court's Brown II
opinion omitted to feature was, nevertheless, implicit in racism's toxic
legacy. Prejudiced opponents of desegregation would oppose a judge's
concrete desegregation injunction in unpredictable and emotional ways,
perhaps leading to extreme behavior, including possible violence.4 ' In
the vernacular-many of Brown's opponents were meaner than a skilletful
of rattlesnakes, about as predictable, and potentially as lethal.
Vituperative segregationists who dominated state and local politics
countenanced semiofficial brutality against peaceful demonstrators. The
national media broadcasted these scenes to an appalled nation; the
notorious publicity almost literally hoisted the segregationists on their
own petard
by persuading Congress to pass two civil rights acts in the
44
1960s.
Other opponents of desegregation were wilier.45 Desegregation's foes
interpreted the phrase "all deliberate speed" to be an omen of the Court's
lack of resolve.46 The lower courts' delay allowed public opposition to
galvanize and harden into conspicuous resistance. The politicians used the
discredited rhetoric of "interposition" to nurture segregationists' hostile
sentiments and to encourage them to think that Brown itself violated the
constitution but that official segregation did not.
Segregationists
adopted "Massive Resistance," a phrase coined by Virginia's Senator
Byrd, as an indispensable article of political faith in states with separate
schools.4 7 Southern members of Congress subscribed to the Southern
Manifesto which pledged opposition to school desegregation. Dual
racial systems persisted in the public sphere. 48
If the Supreme Court's justices needed a legal reminder of
segregationists'
resistance, Little Rock's Cooper v. Aaron soon supplied
it.49 In 1957, Arkansas's Governor Orval Faubus led a campaign
to stop
42.
43.
44.

45.

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
Gewirtz, supra note 39, at 666, 674 nn.222, 224 & 242.
KLARMAN, supra note 6, at 350, 367, 441-42, 462.
Parker, Connecting the Dots, supra note 28, at 1708-16 (summarizing the state

statutes and the litigation during this period); WILKINSON, supra note 33, at 64-102.
46. Ides, supra note 5, at 28; KLARMAN, supra note 6, at 320.
47. JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM 107 (1993).
48. Carl Tobias, Public School Desegregation in Virginia During the PostBrown Decade, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1261 (1996) (interesting on three levels of
desegregation: individual, local, and statewide). WILKINSON, supra note 33, at 61127.
49. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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a federal judge's phased and gradual desegregation injunction from
taking effect in Little Rock.5 ° Public defiance including grotesque
obstruction and threats of violence followed. 5 1 The President dispatched
Army troops and National Guard companies to assure order. 52 The
school board petitioned to delay the effective date of the judge's
controversial desegregation schedule. The Supreme Court responded with
an emphatic "no" based on the principle that public hostility may neither
stop nor defer a federal judge's desegregation order from taking effect.
In denying the Little Rock authorities' request to delay desegregation,
the Court ruled that the state and local authorities could not preserve
public order "by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional
rights" to a desegregated school.53
What occurred under Brown II? After the initial dust had settled and
the Supreme Court had rattled its sabre in Cooper v. Aaron, not much
had actually happened in the practical world of K-12, primary and
secondary, education in the South.54 To begin with, the Court had
condemned state-enforced segregation negatively; but it had not
established a positive desegregation remedies program that generally55
required judges to enjoin states and localities to integrate their schools.
The content of the plaintiffs' rights depended on something that had not
happened: judges' implementation with broadly based concrete injunctions.
On the whole, the Southern school districts' parallel systems of racebased attendance zones remained intact. The federal courts implemented
Brown on a piecemeal basis with orders to a school to integrate at the
behest of an individual plaintiff. A school district continued to be
56
segregated until someone took the initiative to petition a court for change.
Pupil placement evolved under "freedom-of-choice" injunctions. 57 A
judge would order a black child, sometimes children, admitted to a
formerly "white" school. In 1964, only 2.3% of Southern black students
50. Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957).
51. Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron
Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 390-96.
52. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12.
53. Id. at 16.
54. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 132 (1994). Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education: The
Courts'Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1603-04 (2003); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE,
BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S NIGHTMARE?, The Civil Rights Project at
Harvard University 6, 19, 36 (2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/
research/reseg04/brown5O.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
55. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
56. JEFFRIES, supra note 54, at 170.
57. Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 327-28 (4th Cir. 1967), vacated
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Briggs, 132 F. Supp. at 777; Tobias,
supra note 48, at 1278, nn.98-100 & 122-37 (collecting authorities); ANDREW KULL,
THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 176-79 (1992).
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attended majority-white "integrated" schools and in 1968 77.8% of
Southern black students attended 90-100% minority schools. 58 All over
the South, black children walked or rode by "white" schools on their
way to their "black" schools.
The Brown decision's first decade was one of delayed and
microinjunctions. To a detached observer, the persistent incongruity
between the abstract substantive principle of Brown I and the reality of
remedial immobility under Brown II revealed the irony of one set of
values for display, another for use. Something more than logistics was
at work. "The lack of a firm remedy, the lack of a definite timetable for
implementation, and the Court's subsequent unwillingness to fill in these
blanks significantly muted the social and political impact of the
decision," wrote Professor Ron Krotoszynski. 59 For a Southern black
child who started first grade in an underfunded and segregated
elementary school in 1954 or 1955 after the Court decided Brown I, and
who twelve years later finished high school in the same still-segregated
school district, 60 the Brown Court's principle was a broken promise.
IV.

GREEN AND

"Now"

Although it took a long time, events and lower court decisions
convinced the Supreme Court that a school district's "freedom-of-choice"
plan was, to use the commentators' almost unanimous adjective, an
unacceptable "foot-dragging" response to the plaintiffs' unconstitutional
predicament. Two of Judge John Minor Wisdom's decisions for the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals foreshadowed the Supreme Court's
more activist stance. Judge Wisdom insisted that merely stopping
segregation would not suffice and that the school board had a positive
duty to desegregate right away.61
58. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 54, at 19-20.
59. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Chrysanthemum, the Sword, and the First
Amendment: DisentanglingCulture, Community, and Freedom of Expression, 1998 Wis.
L. REV. 905, 982; see also Gewirtz, supra note 39, at 673 n.237 ("The courts' words
about the nature of their remedies (whether candid or dishonest) may be irrelevant. Once
the ideal has been expressed-which is the important step--reality may 'speak' for itself
about whether the ideal has been implemented."); KLUGER, supra note 31, at 752-53
("Throughout the balance of the Fifties, the South interpreted 'all deliberate speed' to
mean 'any conceivable delay,' and desegregation was far more a figment in the mind of
the Supreme Court than a prominent new feature on the American social landscape.").
60. WILKINSON, supra note 33, at 61, 79.
61. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 869 (5th Cir.
1966). "As we see it, the law imposes an absolute duty to desegregate, that is, disestablish
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Under the New Kent County, Virginia school board's "freedom-ofchoice" plan at issue in Green v. County School Board, any child
could attend either the county's formerly white school or its formerly
black school.62 All the white children but only fifteen percent of the
black children attended the formerly white school leaving no white
and eighty-five percent of the minority children in the "formerly"
black school.63 The Supreme Court found that solution diverged from
the Brown Court's principle of desegregation because the racial
identification of both schools persisted and the system remained
"dual." This led the Court in 1968 to strike down New Kent's
freedom-of-choice plan. In addition, "the burden on a school board
today," the Court concluded, "is to come forward with a plan that
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work
its goal: a "unitary, nonracial system
now. '64 The Court articulated
65
of public education.1

How did the Green Court's injunctive remedies work? The Green
decision altered a trial judge's remedial agenda. Under the prior
regime of "freedom of choice" and "all deliberate speed," the judge
would forbid segregation that was required by state law and
integrate the school district on an individual or piecemeal basis.
The judge's new duty was to create a district's positive duty to
cease official segregation and to show concrete results in the school
Because students in New Kent were about 50/50
system.
minority/white in a suburban/rural area without large scale housing
segregation, that judge could desegregate the district with an injunction
that required the school board to assign each student to the closest
school.66
"All deliberate speed" implemented with microinjunctions passed
from the scene; the Supreme Court's new principle was that hereafter the
judge would evaluate a school district's efforts to desegregate by the
segregation. And an absolute duty to integrate." Id. at 846 n.5; Singleton v. Jackson
Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729, 729 (5th Cir. 1965) ("The time has come for
footdragging public school boards to move with celerity toward desegregation."); see
WILKINSON, supra note 33, at 111-12 ("Wisdom transformed the face of school
desegregation law.... 'Those cases mark the most important doctrinal change' in school
integration law since Brown itself. 'Their importance cannot be overemphasized."'

(quoting Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since

Brown v. Board of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1,20 (1975))).
62. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 431-32 (1968).
63. Id. at 441.
64. Id. at 439.
65. Id. at 436; JEFFRIES, supra note 54, at 171-72, 282; Tracy A. Thomas, The

Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional Parameters of Broad

Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 301, 357 n.256 (2004).
66. Green, 391 U.S. at 442 n.6.
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results, as quantified in real numbers. Trial judges began to reduce the
number of public schools that were racially identifiable. 67
As the federal district courts entered a more active period of
desegregation after Green, several new words and phrases entered the
vocabulary of desegregation remedies and injunctions-Neighborhood
Schools, Busing, Racial Balance, Segregation Up North, White Flight,
De Jure vs. De Facto racial separation, the Structural Injunction, the
Tailoring Principle, Local Control (what this Article calls The Bus Stops
Here), and, lastly, Plaintiff-Group Diffusion. This Article will review
the active period of courts' desegregation injunctions by summarizing
these developments and ideas.
Neighborhood Schools. Suppose a school system in a small Southern
town which, before Brown, operated two elementary schools, one
historically black, the other historically white. Under the trial court's
"freedom-of-choice" injunction, a few middle-class minority students
attended the white school, but no white students selected the black
school. After Green interred freedom-of-choice remedies, the judge's
next step was an injunction requiring the school district to divide itself
into two elementary school attendance zones, one zone for each school,
and to replace the parallel segregated systems with two neighborhood
school attendance zones. Each child in the district was assigned to
attend the school in the zone where he or she lived.68
A judge could grant a neighborhood-school injunction to desegregate
a school district in a rural area or a small town. In an urban area or a city
with segregated residential housing, however, a judge's neighborhoodschool order left all-black and all-white schools. 69 Because an elementary
school serves a small area, a neighborhood-school plan left numerous
racially identifiable elementary schools. Nor did neighborhood attendance
zones desegregate large urban areas with multiple school districts because
the plaintiffs' desegregation lawsuits were organized around school
district defendants and the school districts' boundaries often coincided
with racially identifiable city and county housing areas.
Busing. To form the Charlotte-Mecklenberg, North Carolina, school
67. JEFFRIES, supra note 54, at 172. Congress helped the courts. Segregated
public schools receiving federal education grants would lose federal funds under the
federal statutes and regulations.
MATTHEW A. CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG,
DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY: How AMERICA SIDELINED ITS CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS

PUBLIC 140 (2002).

68.
69.

Green, 391 U.S. at 441-42.
supra note 54, at 282.

JEFFRIES,
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system, the city, Charlotte, and the county, Mecklenberg, had merged
the city school district and its suburban districts into one large school
district with an overall white majority. The district's racial composition
was a starting place for a judge to shape an attendance plan. Judge
James McMillan's solution, which the Supreme Court approved, was
twofold: redrawing attendance zones and, more importantly, busing.
The school district's buses transported children between neighborhood
schools to combine them in a less segregated majority-minority mix than
neighborhood attendance zones. 70
The school district's racial composition was the judge's starting place
in shaping the attendance plan. Then the judge could order the district to
transport students between schools to implement that attendance plan.
But the Supreme Court rejected the idea that all schools in a district had
to have the same racial composition, that of the district as a whole. The
courts' bridge concept was "racial balance."
Racial Balance. Racial balance is one of the least precise terms or
concepts in the imprecise vocabulary of desegregation injunctions.
Suppose a school district is divided equally between minority and
nonminority children, that is 50/50. If the school district's elementary
schools vary no more than the judge's "tolerable" or target racialso that they are within 60/40-40/60, then the unit
balance variation,
71
"balances."
If the school district is round and if the minority group students are
concentrated in the center, then the judge can desegregate the schools in
the district and achieve the acceptable target or "balance" by cutting the
district's attendance zones like pieces of pie and ordering busing. A
white child riding a bus from the outer suburban fringe to school in the
center city will meet a minority child on her way from the center to her
suburban school.
Segregation Up North. Legally mandated segregation existed almost
exclusively in the Southern and border states. The Supreme Court's
decision in Keyes v. School District expanded courts' injunction
remedies to school districts without legally compelled segregation.72
Although lacking formal segregation under positive law, the Denver
schools had maintained substantial racial separation through a building
70. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6-11 (1971); see also
Tracy A. Thomas, UnderstandingProphylacticRemedies Through the Looking Glass of
Bush v. Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 384 (2002) ("[T]he busing remedies
that addressed the social and economic causes of educational segregation redefined the
scope of the equal protection guarantee into a de facto rather than a de jure right.").
71. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 22-25 (upholding district court's use of ratio as
starting point, rather than an inflexible requirement).
72. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 202 (1973).
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program augmented by mobile classrooms and optional attendance
zones. Although racially "unbalanced" schools may develop because of
residents' migration patterns, not because of the school board's decisions,
the Keyes trial judge thought this separation comprised segregation
imposed by the state government, albeit indirectly. 73 Moreover the judge
found that the school district authorities had manipulated attendance
districts which warranted a busing order for the whole city and school
district. The Keyes Supreme Court approved, holding that plaintiffs can
show segregation that violates minority students' equal protection
guarantees by proving the cumulative effect of official decisions on
pupil assignments, school construction, transportation, and finance.74
Accordingly, when the school authorities make a series of ostensibly
separate and unrelated official decisions, which cumulatively facilitate
racial separation, the judge could diagnose official segregation and
"cure" it with a district-wide busing injunction aimed to achieve
acceptable racial balance.75 The Court's Keyes decision expanded the
potential reach of the trial courts' desegregation and transportation
injunctions and in turn generated social countermoves, among them
white flight.
White Flight. Middle-class people had been moving to the suburbs
before the Court decided Brown. The white middle-class continued its
migration, school-aged youngsters in tow, accelerated by neighborhoodschool injunctions and pupil-transportation decrees. In some places,
desegregation's opponents' racial prejudice was explicit and their
rhetoric was inflamed. To put it more gently, a judge's busing decree
could erode white middle class parents' support for public education.
These white parents might lack a positive interest in distant schools
where their children attended classes with poor and minority children;
they might choose private schools or opt to move to a suburb. 76 White
residents' migration exacerbated the trial courts' difficulty in desegregating
school districts with Neighborhood Schools and busing injunctions. The
courts evaluated the effect of white flight under the rubric of the
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation.

73. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 279, 282, 287-88 (D. Colo. 1969),
modified 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
74. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 202.
75. Id.at 213.
76. Tobias, supra note 48, at 1288-89.
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De Jure vs. De Facto. The Brown Court's finite principle was
negative: state-mandated school segregation violated a minority child's
rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Particularly after the Keyes
Court's expansion of official segregation beyond explicitly official
segregation, the courts had to contend with the thorny task of defining
when segregation was state-mandated. Courts developed the Latinsounding Legal English categories of de jure and de facto to contain
their answers to this mixed substantive-remedial conundrum and to limit
desegregation injunctions.
The Supreme Court had not said that a child had an enforceable
constitutional right to attend an integrated school. Only a school district's
official racial segregation, segregation de jure or by positive law, violated
the excluded person's right to equal protection. But racial separation, de
facto or in-fact segregation, does not. What proponents of the de jure-de
facto distinction identify as de facto segregation is school segregation
resulting from residential housing patterns, which occur because of
thousands of families' private choices of where to live. These homeowners'
private choices, they argued successfully, absolve the school authorities
from desegregating their schools. "It's not our problem," the school
board would insist.
Detractors of the de jure-de facto distinction urged, unsuccessfully,
that when a court distinguished between de jure and de facto school
segregation and then treated the categories differently, it was employing
a bogus characterization that stunted its response to official and semiofficial
segregation. The detractors pointed out that earlier government decisions
led to the segregated housing patterns. The earlier official decisions fell
under the headings of judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants, city
councils' discriminatory zoning, biased Federal Housing Administration
policies, and local governments' racially motivated public housing siting.
Proponents of the de jure-de facto distinction, its opponents maintained,
concealed the reality of race discrimination when they labeled the school
segregation that resulted as de facto. In other words, as Professor
Richard Ford observed, de jure and de facto distinguish "between
policies that explicitly call for segregation and those that achieve it
without naming it .... Indeed the state or local government could be
found responsible for both kinds of conditions that led to school
segregation. Thus, without more, a segregated school district could be
eligible for a judge's desegregation remedy, including attendance zones
and a busing injunction. This argument did not succeed, leaving "de
facto" minority-majority separation a major substantive-remedial
limitation on a judge's ability to desegregate schools.
77.

Richard Thompson Ford, Brown's Ghost, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1305, 1308 (2004).
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The StructuralInjunction. A Green-era desegregation injunction was
complicated. The judge had to contend with several of the defendant
school system's features: distinctions between de jure and de facto
segregation, students' attendance zones and pupil assignments, faculty and
staff assignments, facilities, extracurricular activities, and transportation. 1
A mature desegregation injunction is an archetype of what Professor
Owen Fiss named the "structural injunction." In the 1970s, Professor
Fiss formulated and articulated the concept of the structural injunction to
describe a complex court order that a judge grants to redirect a school
district's trajectory from its unconstitutional "dual" path toward a
"unitary" and constitutional target.79
As described by Professor Abram Chayes, "public law litigation"
leading to a structural injunction has several characteristics. 80 Structural
litigation is "polycentric." Numerous plaintiffs and interest groups are
contesting future government policy. 8' State and local governments are the

defendants. The federal constitution is the source of the plaintiffs' rights.
The judge's substantive decision in public law and structural litigation
is merely the prologue to a lengthy remedial production. In a state with
a statute that required segregated schools, the trial judge's substantive
equal protection decision was, after Brown I, rudimentary: the statute as
well as the practices that flowed from it violated
minority-student
82
plaintiffs' constitutional right to equal protection.
The judge's fundamental and troublesome questions focused almost
exclusively on the plaintiffs' remedy. Since the plaintiffs were not
seeking compensatory damages, the judge's lone feasible remedy was an
injunction, whose size and shape was yet to be divined. After a glance at
history to confirm the school district's violation of the plaintiffs'
substantive rights, the litigants and judge turn forward to focus on what
should happen to the school district and its program in the future.
Instead of a retrospective money judgment, the judge's structural

78.

Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).

79. OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 9 (1978) [hereinafter FiSS, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION].

80. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
81. Id. at 1310.
82. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 26, at 1062-63 (asserting that determining
substantive liability is the least controversial aspect of institutional reform adjudication
and is often uncontested); see also Parker, Connecting the Dots, supra note 28, at 170814 (summarizing several legislative ruses and the courts' responses).
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remedy is a prospective injunction that will affect future governmental
policy and touch upon the lives of many people. Judges had to depart
from the modest prohibitive injunction that Thurgood Marshall
suggested at oral argument which avoids improper executive or
legislative enactments and simply tells the school district's authorities
what they "can't" do. 3 A judge's desegregation injunction became a
mandatory decree that requires conduct and tells the defendants what
they "must" do. At the remedy stage, the judge enters a structural injunction
to suppress the school district's constitutional violations and, after Green, to
direct its policy into constitutional channels. Because of its forwardlooking orientation and the complexity of developing and administering
a structural injunction, public law litigation is protracted, becoming a
lengthy process that two alliterative scholars labeled a "rolling-rule
regime. '84 Public law litigation, Chayes posited, alters the center of
gravity between the litigants and their lawyers, on the one hand, and the
judge, on the other, spurring the trial judge to assume a more central role
because of the litigation's governmental policy component.8 5
While most of Chayes's description remains prescient, a structural
lawsuit's future dynamic undercuts the last point, that the judge manages
and directs structural-injunction litigation. Plaintiffs and school district
defendants developed a yearly cycle of negotiating, drafting, and
submitting a "plan," seeking judicial approval of the year's plan, and
incorporating the plan into a complex structural injunction.8 6 The
lawyers' and experts' yearly cycle thrusts those specialist lawyers and
education "experts" into the core of policymaking and upstages the
judge. The negotiated
consent decree leading to "settlement" becomes the
87
principal script. Although the judge who must approve a class action
settlement 88 is not completely offstage, the lawyers and their allied interest
groups become the central players in structural injunction litigation.89
The structural injunction has been controversial. The structural
phenomena spread from schools to other state and local government
functions and departments. Judges have granted structural injunctions
against state hospitals, prisons, and jails. Supporters of the structural
83. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
84. Sabel & Simon, supra note 26, at 1069.
85. Chayes, supra note 80, at 1284.
86. Sabel & Simon, supra note 26, at 1067-72.
87. Id.
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
89. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 118-22; Margo Schlanger, Beyond
the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994,
2010-22 (1999); Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School
Desegregation and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1628 (2003)
[hereinafter Parker, The Decline of JudicialDecisionmaking].
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injunction focus on the court's need to protect plaintiffs' rights primarily
under the U.S. Constitution and its goal of implementing effective
remedies; in short, the court's structural injunction makes the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights real. 90 And, proponents maintain, the skeptics'
common arguments against structural relief including principles of
federalism, separation of powers, and the rule of law, as well as their
logistic arguments against structural relief are not persuasive when
balanced against society's need to vindicate plaintiffs' constitutional
rights.9 1
In granting structural relief, a judge's school desegregation injunction
may include increased resources for learning as well as for transportation.
Similarly courts developed educational techniques like the magnet
school. A magnet school has an enriched program and curriculum that
the administrators believe will draw or attract both minority and majority
students; this attraction leads, they maintain, to more education, less
busing. 92 Someone, however, has to pay for a structural injunction,
which is another phrase for an under- or un-funded mandate. School
administrators and other structural injunction defendants learned how to
take advantage of the cycle of court injunctions based on plans and
negotiated consent decrees to increase available resources. While the
judge cannot appropriate money, the judge and the litigation's publicity
and momentum frequently stimulate other bodies to augment the
defendants' funds. 93 "The judge made me do it," the education authorities
can tell their appropriating body. "Winning by losing" is the name
Professor Margo Schlanger gave this feature of structural litigation. 94
Taking a less rosy and sanguine view, two Supreme Court Justices,
Scalia and Thomas, have objected to how long structural relief takes and

90. Hon. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional
Litigation, 32 ALA. L. REV. 271 (1981); Hon. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In Defense of

Judicial Activism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901 (1979) (symposium on Brown's 25th
Anniversary); Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION, supra note 79, at 92-93; Poser, supra
note 28, at 297-98; Thomas, supra note 65, at 302.
91. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY
MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS

(1998); Poser, supra note 28, at 318; Wendy Parker, The Future of School
Desegregation, 94 N.W. U. L. REV. 1157, 1221 (2000) [hereinafter Parker, The Future of

School Desegregation];Sabel & Simon, supra note 26, at 1090-100.
92. Gewirtz, supra note 39, at 653.
93. Sabel & Simon, supra note 26, at 1082.
94. Schlanger, supra note 89, at 2012; see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 26, at
1065, 1092.
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how complex the injunctions are. 95 Justice Scalia has expressed concern
about whether a federal judge ought to employ a complex injunction at
all. 96 Indeed, Justice Scalia wrote in a decision that was not about
education, the federal district court's "equitable jurisdiction," which he
defined as the conditions amenable to a chancellor of equity's injunctive
solution and the type of injunction the chancellor can grant, is restricted
to the type of relief the English Chancery court could have granted in the
late eighteenth century,97 hardly a time of active school desegregation.
According to Justice Thomas, a judge who concludes, based on a
school district's attendance zone and majority-minority imbalance, that
the district has fostered past discrimination is saying, implicitly, that
black children are inferior to white and need to be in school with white
children to learn. 98 Thomas also assails the U.S. courts' structural
injunctions as exceeding the "inherent limitations" on the federal courts'
remedial authority. 99

Scholars skeptical about the structural injunction have proposed a
comprehensive agenda of procedural and remedies rules to curb what
they perceive as a wrongheaded judicial proclivity to overindulge in
granting and approving structural injunctions:100 A United States judge,
in their view, should decline altogether to grant or approve an injunction
that would create state or local government policy, dictate specific
means, or supplant state or local officials.' 0 A judge who does approve
a structural injunction should be amenable to updating and modifying it,
according to their position.10 2 In any event, the skeptics argue that a
governmental defendant's remedial obligations in a consent decree
10 3
should end when the official who consented to it leaves office.
Charges of contempt against a defendant for violating a structural
injunction should not be assigned to the judge who originally granted or
approved the injunction. A judge, moreover, should rotate off a structural
injunction lawsuit after an eight-year "term limit."' 4 A structural
injunction should contain the timetable for its finale.'0 5 Short of that,
95. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 125 (1995) (Thomas, J.,concurring);
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 500 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
96. Int'l Union, UMWA v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 843-44 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
97. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S.
308, 318 (1999).
98. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 118-19 (Thomas, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 124.
100. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 197-221.
101. Id. at 204.
102.

103.
104.
105.

Id. at 213-14.

Id. at 214.
Id.at 216.
Id. at 219.
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according to the skeptics, the judge should terminate an injunction
whenever the defendant stops threatening plaintiffs' substantive rights.
Although the skeptics have not secured comprehensive success for
their reform program, courts dealing with structural injunctions to
desegregate schools developed new variations on the countervailing
considerations mentioned above, 10 6 called the tailoring principle and
local control.
The Tailoring Principle. The tailoring principle is one technique a
legislature or an appellate court can employ to reduce a trial judge's
remedial discretion and to rein in his discretion if it becomes too
exuberant. Tailoring requires the judge to build an injunction on a
substructure of findings of fact; it leads the judge to draft an injunction
that forbids defendants' activity but only to protect the particular
plaintiffs from illegal injury from defendant's identified misconduct.
The judge, in the Supreme Court's language, should formulate an
injunction to "restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the
position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct. 10 7
"[T]he nature of the [plaintiffs' injunction] remedy is to be determined
by the nature and scope of the [defendant's] constitutional violation." 10 8
Critics of the structural injunction agree with the tailoring principle as
part of their overall program to curb improper judicial activism, to guard
against excessive judicial discretion, and to prevent a judge from usurping
executive and legislative power. The federal judge, who is appointed,
not elected, should, they insist, leave decisions about the general
direction of governmental policy to the elected, or "political," executive
and legislative, branches of government. In particular, the judge should
identify the defendant's violation and the plaintiffs' injury and then draft
an injunction that orders the defendant to correct past violations and
forbids the defendant from future violations of plaintiffs' rights. The judge
should require plaintiffs "to show that the harm to be repaired was in
fact caused by defendants' illegal action and that the decree provisions
are narrowly targeted to repair those injuries." 10 9 Nothing more.
106. See supranotes 36-39 and accompanying text.
107. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,280 (1977) (Milliken II, quoting Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) (Milliken I)). In the sentence in the text, "restore" is
overstated. After decades of state mandated segregation, "restoring" or returning a
child, school desegregation plaintiff, to where she would have been absent the official
segregation seems contradictory, if not impossible.
108. Id.
109. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 197-200, 203.
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Proponents of the structural injunction criticize the tailoring principle.
The tailoring principle, Professor Fiss wrote, addressing the relationship
between right, remedy, and discretion, may mislead a casual reader
because it "suggests that the relationship between remedy and violation
is deductive or formal, and thereby gives us an impoverished notion of
remedy."' 10 The tailoring principle, Fiss maintained, circumscribes the
judge's remedial choices and possibilities. It ties the plaintiffs' injunction to
the defendant's violation: the defendant's violation becomes the sole
source of the plaintiffs' injunction, only one injunctive remedy fits the
violation, and that injunction is tethered logically to the defendant's
violation. This connection, Fiss wrote, is too attenuated to allow the judge
to correct the intricacies of a bureaucratic defendant's constitutional
infraction. The judge's remedial task requires discretion and flexibility.
The judge's structural reform ceases to be "command and control," if it
ever was."1 Suppressing all of a shrewd defendant's unconstitutional
agenda may oblige the judge and the plaintiffs' lawyers to nurse a
complex structural injunction through several stages, adjusting it to a
changing, gradually improving, world, learning all the while from the
defendants, as well as from experience. 12
The tailoring principle's proponents and opponents debate the merits
of the structural injunction along a major fault line between champions
and skeptics. The concepts below that follow the tailoring principle also
form a bridge to the next Part of this Article, which discusses the
remedies rules for dissolving and modifying a desegregation injunction.
Local Control. The judge, in drafting a desegregation injunction,
"must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in
managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution." ' 1 3 Local
control is another way for a policymaker, lawyer, or judge to talk about
two countervailing considerations discussed above: federalism and
separation of powers.' 4 Much of the discussion of local control comes
under the heads of technical expertise and specialization. The school's
operation reverts to state and local government officials where members
of the community and specialists direct its future." 5
110. FiSS, supra note 4, at 39; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 47 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, Forms of Justice].
111.
Sabel & Simon, supra note 26, at 1052.
112. Fiss, supra note 4, at 40; Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 110, at 46; see also
Poser, supra note 28, at 359-60 (discussing Fiss's right-remedy analysis and advocating
an "Interest Theory" of rights).
113. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280-81.
114. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text; see also Parker, Connecting the
Dots, supra note 28, at 1746-60 (discussing the connection between local control,
federalism, and separation of powers).
115. In Virginia during the period of the Supreme Court's "all deliberate speed" and
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The kernel of truth in local control as a guiding concept is that public
education is a tax-supported government service that exists in a fragile
state and local government's political environment. If a public consensus
that education is crucial is lacking, the educational system as a social
enterprise is endangered.! 1 6 Local control is a convenient policy anchor
for many federal judges who had experience in state and local government
and politics before taking the bench. This policy anchor may lead a
judge to subordinate the imprecise nature of the plaintiffs' substantive
right to a desegregated school to the concrete value of local control by
local people.
Another note of caution about local control is appropriate. On the one
hand, the "control group" may incorporate local control into the dynamic
cycle of plan submission and approval leading to structural consent
decrees. On the other, however, the local citizens who implement local
control may be cast from the same mold as the people who operated the
segregated system in the first place. The judge may be at risk of putting
the son of the proverbial fox in charge of desegregating the schoolhouse." 7
The Bus Stops Here. This concept addresses the issue of whether a
judge may grant an injunction to attain "racial balance" by ordering the
school districts to transport children across school district lines. The
metropolitan Detroit area, as one example, is shaped like a metaphorical
donut, not a pie: the city of Detroit is the donut's hole, and, on land,
Detroit is almost surrounded by other separately organized political units
with their own school districts. In Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme
Court rejected a trial judge's desegregation decree for the city district of
Detroit that transported children to and from neighboring school districts
to achieve better racial balance in the whole metropolitan area." 8 The
judge's injunction, the Court held, was restricted to the discrete
defendant school district as a political unit." 9 Unless the judge found an
the state government's "massive resistance," see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying
text, "local control" also meant moderation-that is a school district in compliance with
Brown Iis gradual desegregation approach, as opposed to the state government's
"massive resistance."
116. JEFFRIES, supra note 54, at 285.
117. Cf. Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies, supra note 28, at
479 ("The Supreme Court's approach to school desegregation in particular and public
law remedies in general has prevented lower court judges from undertaking principled,
well-grounded remedial processes and has ceded too much remedial power to the
defendants, the alleged or adjudicated wrongdoers.").
118. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974), affd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
119. Id. at 744-46.
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interdistrict violation, he could not order interdistrict busing of students.
Because of the consequences for third persons in non-party districts, the
trial judge had to tailor a school district's desegregation injunction to the
"wrongdoer" defendant-school district's violation, the Court said. 120
One effect of a single-district injunction is to limit the length and duration of
students' bus rides.
At first blush, the Michigan district judge's multidistrict injunction
resembled a judge's improper decree enjoining nondefendant Ben
because of defendant Alice's tort. An observer who views the overall
problem of segregation more spaciously, however, may criticize the
Milliken Court on the ground that it focused too narrowly on the
particular school district's lines instead of on zoning and other
governmental policies that may have affected parents' decisions about
where to live. The Court's approach isolated school segregation from
the rest of society. A school desegregation injunction, the Court held, is
not a permissible way to attack other forms of segregation, separate from
educational segregation. 12' The Court's decision in Milliken qualified
Green by allowing racially identifiable schools in different school
districts; it also affected third parties outside the formal litigation
because busing children only to the school district's border often places
the third-party burden on the working- and lower-middle
class members
122
of both the majority and the minority groups.
The Court's Milliken decision was a dividing line. If the Court began
a second (but judicial) reconstruction
in Brown, it withdrew from active
23
reconstruction in Milliken.'
Plaintiff-Group Diffusion. 2 4 During the Green era, the AfricanAmerican or "plaintiffs" group began to articulate more diffuse goals.
Under one reading of Brown, legally compelled racial segregation
isolated minority children culturally and psychologically, imposed a
stigma, and undermined their ability to learn. When a court ends a child's
isolation, under this reading, her learning will improve. If multiracial
120.

Id.

121. Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1977).
122. JEFFRJES, supra note 54, at 319; see Gewirtz, supra note 39, at 604-05
(describing how effective remedies are often not possible without imposing significant
costs-such as long-distance transportation-on nonviolating third parties).
123. Fiss, supra note 4, at 246; see Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education:
Brieffor Respondents, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1401, 1405 (2003) (describing the challenges
of transitioning from separate to mixed schooling); see also Ford, supra note 77, at
1312-13 (describing Milliken I as undermining Brown by reinforcing segregationist
background rule of legally-responsible local government entities).
124. This segment summarizes a complex and textured history. For a fuller
treatment, in the context of injunctions to implement Brown in Atlanta, see Tomiko
Brown-Nagin, An HistoricalNote on the Significance of the Stigma Rationalefor a Civil
Rights Landmark, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 991 (2004).
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schools were the solution, courts' busing and interdistrict remedies were
indispensable.
This led proponents to maintain that a nonbusing
injunction may compromise the students' constitutional rights.
What is the goal, others ask, racial balance and desegregation or
educational opportunity and quality? They discount racial balance and
emphasize learning-which they contend can occur any place, even
close to home.125 These skeptics argue that busing children leads to
spending scarce money on transportation, money that could be better
spent directly on education. In any event, judge-ordered busing only to
the school district line was a halfhearted solution because while it
"balanced" the schools within a district, it left the "balance" among
systems alone. Local control again emerged as a policy goal, but this
time on the plaintiffs' side.
If an African-American consensus on techniques to desegregate schools
ever existed, the debate
summarized above shows that it fractured in the
126
1970s and 1980s.
Even qualified by countervailing considerations, as discussed above,
the courts' Green-era injunctions setting neighborhood attendance zones
and using busing to achieve better attendance zones changed minoritymajority school demography. In 1972-1973, in formerly segregated
states, 36.4% of black children attended majority white schools and in
1988, 43.5% of black children attended majority white schools. 127 Was
the afternoon bell ringing for desegregation litigation?
V. THE "UNITARY" EXIT STRATEGY

In 2004, four generations of school children have started kindergarten
and completed high school under federal judges' injunctive eye.
Desegregation litigation continues.1 28 Obvious desegregation has occurred
in many school districts.1 29 How does a judge tell when to withdraw
judicial oversight? In short, school-desegregation litigation and the
injunction end when the defendant school district is "unitary."

125.

Bell, J.,Dissenting, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE

SAID 185-200 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
126. WILKINSON, supra note 33, at 232-34.
127. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 54, at 19, tbl. 7.
128. Parker, The Future of School Desegregation,supra note 91, at 1207-08.
129. See generally William L. Taylor, Title I as an Instrument for Achieving
Desegregationand Equal EducationalOpportunity,81 N.C. L. REV. 1751 (2003).
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"Unitary" started its career in desegregation injunctions' vocabulary
meaning "not dual." "Dual" meant one school system in a school district for
majority students, another parallel "separate" system in the same district
for minority students.130 The "dual" school district is a relic of history.
The Supreme Court left the positive side of the meaning of "unitary"
unclear; the length of a school system's journey from "dual" to "unitary"
in time and treasure remained mostly obscure.13 1 A judge will use the
term "unitary" to express his conclusion that a school desegregation
lawsuit is over. That decision will occur in the ready-made procedural-32
remedial context for dissolving and modifying all kinds of injunctions. 1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) tells a judge to relieve a
defendant from a final judgment, an injunction, when "it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application."' 133 In
an inquiry that folds substantive doctrine into remedial analysis, many
courts have attempted to develop operative definitions of "unitary" to
decide school districts' motions to modify and dissolve desegregation
injunctions. 134,
In a 1932 opinion written by Justice Cardozo, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Swift & Co., had established the stringent "grievous
wrong" test for dissolving a consent decree in an antitrust injunction:
We are not framing a decree. We are asking ourselves whether anything
has happened that will justify us now in changing a decree. The injunction,
whether right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment in its application to
the conditions that existed at its making. We are not at liberty to reverse
under the guise of readjusting. Life is never static, and the passing of a
decade has brought changes to the grocery business as it has to every other.
The inquiry for us is whether the changes are so important that dangers,
130. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435-36 (1968).
131. Parker, The Future of School Desegregation,supra note 91, at 1162. The
Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed, does not need to define "unitary." Bd. of Educ.
v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 245-46 (1991).
132. The Supreme Court's decisions to terminate desegregation injunctions in
selected school districts overlap with lower courts' desegregation decisions in other
lawsuits. Parker, The Future of School Desegregation,supra note 91, at 1178-80. In
addition, the 1990s were a period of conservative judicial and legislative "injunction
reform." Two of the Court's termination-modification decisions concerned "conditions
injunctions," federal courts' structural injunctions in prison lawsuits. Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343 (1996); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992). The
courts' cluster of injunction-termination decisions in schools and prisons foreshadowed
Congress's 1996 legislative "injunction reform," the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1915, 1915A (2000); 42
U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. (2000). Aimed at prison injunctions, the PLRA, among other
things, legislates the tailoring principle, curbs consent decrees, reduces attorney fees, and
accelerates termination of injunctions. Schlanger, supra note 89, at 2034.
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
134. David I. Levine, The Latter Stages of Enforcement of Equitable Decrees: The
Course of Institutional Reform After Dowell, Rufo, and Freeman, 20 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 579 (1993) (contributing to a symposium on Brown's legacy at forty).
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once substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow. No doubt the
defendants will be better off if the injunction is relaxed, but they are not
suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected as to justify us in saying that
they are the victims of oppression. Nothing less than a clear showing of
grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to
change what
was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all
135
concerned.

In structural desegregation litigation, a judge implements change over
a period of time using specific and complex injunctive provisions to end
an unconstitutional official segregated regime. Reasoning from the
discussions above about the distinction between right and remedy, the
judge's discretion and the tailoring principle, the judge's structural task
calls for a termination standard more pragmatic, more experimental, and
more responsive to legal and factual change than Swift's "grievous
wrong" test.
Professor Owen Fiss wrote that a structural decree has a "tentative and
hesitant character." A judge's "particular choice of [injunctive terms] can
never be defended with any certitude. [The injunction] must always be
open to revision ....A revision is justified if the [injunction] is not working
effectively or is unnecessarily burdensome. 11 36 Skeptics of structural
injunctions are close to agreement: constitutional-injunction defendants
37
should be able to persuade the judge toSO."'
modify
an injunction "whenever
for doing
they have a reasonable basis
In 1986, in a prescient and perspicacious article, Professor Tim Jost
predicted that the judicial standard for dissolving an injunction would be
tested and forged in the crucible of the more conservative post-Warren
Court judges' response to the structural injunctions that stemmed from
the Warren Court's substantive constitutional decisions. 38 In Board of
Education v. Dowell, a school desegregation lawsuit, the Supreme Court
vindicated39Jost's prediction and repudiated Swift's "grievous wrong"
standard.1
The Supreme Court's Dowell "unitariness" test to determine whether a
judge should terminate a school-desegregation injunction has two,
perhaps three, elements: first, whether the school district is complying in
135.
136.

United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
Fiss, supra note 4, at 41.

137.
138.

SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 4, at 213-14.
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of

Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1106-07 (1986).
139. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991); Levine, supra note 134, at
624.
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good faith with the injunction; and, second, whether district's vestiges 1 of
40
past discrimination have been eliminated "to the extent practicable."
The Court rejected an even more relaxed test, that of whether the school
district's compliance with the desegregation injunction equals unitary
status.'4 ' The Court's phrase "to the extent practicable" underscored the
judge's flexibility, discretion, and need to consider logistics. A possible
third element is whether the school district
is fully rehabilitated, or stated
142
in the negative, whether it will reoffend.
In Freeman v. Pitts, the Court reaffirmed the Dowell test and added
"partial unitariness"; this allows a judge to modify a desegregation
injunction to whittle away at its original scope. 43 School districts,
parents, lawyers, and trial judges must litigate around the lack of144
clarity
about what is a "remedy" and what "unitary" and "vestige" mean.
In Missouri v. Jenkins, the trial judge had based the injunction on the
concept of "desegregative attractiveness"-if the judge orders the school
authorities to improve the desegregated public schools sufficiently, then
the public schools will attract nonminority students from private schools
and other public school districts.1 45 The Supreme Court thought
"desegregative attractiveness" raised the specter of unlimited liability; it
rejected the trial judge's solution as too extravagant
and too detached
146
from the defendants' equal protection violation.
The unitariness standard for a judge to dissolve an injunction preserves
the de facto-de jure characterization. If a "good-faith" school district's
"vestige" of segregation is "de facto" and not due to the school authorities'
official decisions, then the district nevertheless may be "unitary." For
example, a particular school district's lack of "racial balance" may
result
47
from the demography or voluntary changes in housing patterns. 1
The Court's more general point is that when a school district proves
that the effects of intentional segregation are behind it, the judge should
release it from the injunction. The judge's "retained-jurisdiction" oversight
that may have begun with Brown II should cease. As a remedial
principle, the "unitariness" test, even as the Court elaborated it in Dowell
140. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492 (1992); Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50.
141. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50.
142. Id. at 247; Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, supra note 91, at 1164.
143. Freeman,503 U.S. at 489; Levine, supra note 134, at 610.
144. See, e.g., Dowell, 498 U.S. at 245-46.
145. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 91 (1995).
146. Id. at 89-98; see also Thomas, supra note 65, at 333-35 (discussing Jenkins
and other recent cases where the Court has required properly targeted relief).
147. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F,3d 305, 322 (4th Cit.
2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002). For follow-up, see John Charles
Boger, Education's "Perfect Storm "? Racial Resegregation, High Stakes Testing, and
School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina,81 N.C. L. REV 1375, 1394-95
(2003); Celeste Smith, When Busing Ends, N.Y. TIMEs EDUC. LIFE, Jan. 18, 2004, at 30.
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and Freeman, is potentially susceptible to abuse by a trial judge because
it is too subjective and delegates too much discretion to the trial judge.
As the Green era of desegregation injunctions winds down, many
institutional-reform lawsuits have developed their own pattern and
momentum and their structural injunctions endure. After an initial look
back at the defendant's substantive violation and perhaps a period of
contentious adversary activity, the litigants developed a cycle of negotiating
detailed consent decrees. The proceedings relax, and class action
settlement hearings begin to focus on technicalities. Parallel specialist
bureaucracies emerged through the cycles of negotiation focused on the
defendant's court-ordered periodic reports and plans, and the judge's
successive approvals of plans embodied in consent decrees. 148 The litigants
concentrate more on how to micromanage the details of administering
schools than on injunctions or constitutional law. 14 9 Judicial decisions
are detailed examinations of implementation and procedure. 150 When
this happens, desegregation litigation and injunctions begin to fly
under the legal scholar's radar. The bevy of articles that scholars had
published earlier about "legitimacy" and the meta-meaning of
constitutional values, now largely irrelevant to the actual1 5business
1
being conducted, gathers dust on the litigants' library shelves.
The Dowell test to free the defendant from a court decree places a
costly and imprecise burden on the school district.152 The district may
not want liberation. 153 For one thing, the school district's process 154
of
petitioning to seek release may itself expose embarrassing facts.
Another potential reason for a defendant to be reticent is that its
administrators may have figured out that the judge can be, in effect,
155 an
ally in tapping sources of appropriations otherwise not available.
Many school districts have disdained to ask the courts for "unitary"
148. Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, supra note 91, at 1216 n.347.
See generally Sabel & Simon, supra note 26.
149.

Sabel & Simon, supra note 26, at 1067-72; SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra

note 4, at 118-22; Schlanger, supra note 89, at 2010-22; Parker, The Decline of Judicial
Decisionmaking,supra note 89, at 1628.
150. Parker, The Future of School Desegregation,supra note 91, at 1191-95.
151. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 26, at 1082 ("[M]uch academic and appellate
doctrinal discussion of public law litigation is not responsive to the most promising
elements of recent practice.").
152. Parker, The Future of School Desegregation,supra note 91, at 1164, 1166.
153. Id. at 1207-09.
154. Id. at l160.
155. Schlanger, supra note 89, at 2012.
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findings, although larger districts are more likely to petition. As a result,
school desegregation litigation continues with hundreds of injunctions
and consent decrees still in effect 156 In other words, although the
Court adjusted the test a judge applies to terminate an injunction to
favor a school-district defendant, the new yardstick has not galvanized
all defendants to terminate their very own structural injunctions. After
half a century, school-desegregation litigation is institutionalized.
VI.

THE AUTHOR'S OBSERVATIONS ABOUT

THE PAST, SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE
FUTURE, AND CONCLUSIONS ABOUT

SUBSTANCE AND REMEDY

A. The Past
Brown I was a watershed-"a decision of unquestioned correctness, a
starting point for normative reasoning in domains far removed from
schools and race."' 157 Brown
succeeded in ending racial segregation
158
required by positive law.

Brown II was, however, a low-keyed starting point for school
desegregation. That decision and the way the lower courts implemented
it with school-desegregation injunctions earn fewer laurels because
ending segregation proved elusive. In retrospect, Justice Hugo Black,
who opposed withholding "a person's constitutional right for any reason
once that right had been determined,"' 159 seemed to favor a better
remedy-to order the trial judges at the outset to require the school
district-defendants to admit the named and class
plaintiffs immediately
6
to schools with race-neutral attendance zones.' 0
156. Sabel & Simon, supra note 26, at 1018-19. But see Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of
the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops... It's Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143
(2003) (overworking the metaphor that the structural injunction is "dead").
157. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION, supra note 79, at 5.
158. See Tobias, supra note 48, at 1291 & nn.144-49 (dealing with library
segregation-desegregation, a subject closely related to formal education); MATTHEW
BATTLES, LIBRARY: AN UNQUIET HISTORY 180-84 (2003).
159. Charles A. Reich, Deciding the Fate of Brown: The Populist Voices of Earl
Warren and Hugo Black, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 137, 140 (2004).
160. Ides, supra note 5, at 28 (ordering plaintiffs admitted was "the remedy to
which they were entitled").
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky's more activist remedial recipe is to abolish private
schools, create metro-wide systems, and equalize per-pupil spending statewide. See
Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 AM.
U. L. REV. 1461, 1472 (2003). Notably, Professor Chemerinsky would not abolish the
states as separate political entities.
Contrast Professor Mark Tushnet who, when quoted on the effect of "all deliberate speed,"
observed that because of white resistance, "an order directing immediate desegregation would
have had no greater effect." Wendell LaGrand, Brown at 50, ABA JOURNAL, Apr. 2004, at
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By severing the plaintiffs' remedy from their right, the Brown II
Court's "all deliberate speed" sent the wrong signal to friends and
opponents alike. The decision to detach the plaintiffs' remedy from their
right seems to have stemmed from several Supreme Court justices'
compromise, formal or informal, that, by allowing the plaintiffs' remedy
to be delayed, achieved the goal of unanimity. 16 1 Opponents read it,
however, as a tacit signal of the Court's lack of resolve. 162 Segregationists
honed their tactics of opposition, obfuscation, intimidation, disputation,
and delay to take advantage of the Court's lack of determination. 163 If
Brown II's "all deliberate speed" was not a mistake from the beginning,
it became one as time passed; but it lasted long enough for a black firstgrade child to graduate from a segregated high school. Some of the
reasons follow.
A critic who blames the lower courts' dilatory, think-small solutions
to school segregation exclusively on three words in Brown II overlooks
centuries of history and more than a decade of other decisions and
decision makers.
"All deliberate speed" may have expressed the
justices' naive trust in articulated abstraction and graduated progress
divorced from the practical reality of implementation. But I prefer the
Court's naivet6 to the obtuseness, moral numbness, and explicit hostility
that the Brown principle encountered in an antagonistic white South and,
to some extent, the whole United States.
In Green, the Court moved from Fabian solutions to the positive and
imperative remedial program of ordering the defendants to desegregate
'
their schools "now."164
Although educational opportunities improved
for many children, countervailing considerations and officials' prejudice
continued to impede desegregation. The Swann decision which approved
attendance zones and busing was also "a murky opinion that seemed to
look in several directions at once."'1 65 In Milliken, the Court erected an

38, 44; see also Bell, supra note 123, at 1405-07 (proposing separate but really equal); Bell,
supra note 125, at 185-200 (asserting that Brown perpetuates our long history of racism and
suggesting realistic rather than symbolic relief).
161. Jack M. Balkin, The History of the Brown Litigation, in WHAT BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 29,37-38 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
162. Ides, supra note 5, at 28.
163. Tobias, supra note 48, at 1300; Ides, supranote 5, at 27-28.
164. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968); see supra notes 62-67
and accompanying text.
165. JEFFRIES, supra note 54, at 287; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); see supra text accompanying note 42.
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unnecessary stop sign at the school district's border. 166 In the meantime,
population shifts resegregated urban school districts.167 Did busing
flunk the test because courts halted the bus at the district line? Or did it
disappoint observers 1because
it was part of a halfhearted remedial
68
program to start with?
Enough desegregation occurred in many school districts, however, for
those courts to conclude that the districts had achieved "unitary" status
and to disengage from
69 direct school monitoring. Elsewhere desegregation
litigation continues. 1
A report card reveals several grades. In the Southern states that started
the Brown epoch with dual systems, the percentage of black children
who attended predominantly white schools increased during the period
this Article summarizes. In 1954 it was zero; in 1964 under the freedom-ofchoice recipe for an injunction, only 2.3% of southern minority students
attended integrated schools. After a slow start, the courts' desegregation
of schools accelerated in its second, or Green, era. Busing beyond
neighborhood attendance zones meant that in the 1972-1973 school year,
36.4% of black children attended majority white schools in the former
Confederate states; by 1988, the figure was 43.5%. However, that 43.5%
was the peak; demography, white flight, and court decisions braked
desegregation. By 2000, the percentage of black children in majority white
schools in the South had dropped to thirty-one. 70 The period of decline
follows judges' decisions that found school districts "unitary," dissolved or
modified their injunctions, and allowed them to stop busing students.
Real educational and vocational opportunities exist for children today
because of school desegregation. "[L]egal and political developments in the
half-century since Brown have alleviated, but by no means eliminated, the
racial stratification of American society," said Professor Reva Siegel in
2004.171
166.

Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974), affd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); see supra

notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
167. Boger, supra note 147, at 1385.
168. Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Achieving Equality of EducationalOpportunity in the
Wake of JudicialRetreat From Race Sensitive Remedies: Lessons From North Carolina,
52 AM. U. L. REV. 1477 (2003).
169. Parker, The Future of School Desegregation,supra note 91, at 1207.
170. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 54, at 19, thl. 7; David J. Garrow, Clarendon
County in Black & White: A Visit to the Home of Briggs v. Elliot, 50 Years After Brown
v. Board of Education, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 237 (2004). This was confirmed by Mr. Joseph
Delaine, a native of Clarendon County and a member of the Presidential Commission on
the Brown Decision in a presentation at the South Eastern Association of Law Schools
on July 31, 2004. Mr. Delaine was on a panel, Southern History & Perspectives: A
Retrospective on Brown v. Board of Education, organized by Professor Lewis Burke.
See the popular account in TONY HORWITZ, CONFEDERATES IN THE ATTIC: DISPATCHES
FROM THE UNFINISHED CIVIL WAR 367-71, 377-78 (1998).

171.

Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordinationand Anticlassification Values
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B. The Future
In 2004, explicit racism is unfashionable in "mainstream" culture.
Fifty years ago, many people believed that the human race was divided
into a hierarchy of scientifically differing racial groups. 17 2 Among scientists

today, those pseudo-scientific racial theories are extinct. Contemporary
social scientists define "race" as a social-cultural, not a scientific, concept;
different cultures define race differently; and physical scientists have
trouble defining it at all. 173 Scientists and educators have not completed
this task, for only a fool would174assert that race prejudice has been
extirpated from the United States.
Fifty years after Brown the United States is no longer merely divided
into black and white. Hispanic-Latino people comprise the largest minority
group. Latin-Americans speaking Spanish and Portuguese languages are
viewed as coming from all "races," economic backgrounds, and cultures.
Urban school districts also have large numbers of south and east Asian
students.
Education litigation has branched out. Plaintiffs file educational
finance lawsuits in state courts under state constitutions and allege
unequal or inadequate state and regional spending. These plaintiffs'
state lawsuits have achieved some success, encountered some failures
and some real morasses, and triggered prodigious conflict between state
courts and state legislatures. 175 The major present-day threat to strong
and effective public education comes not from the courts but from state
legislatures' and Congress's parsimoniousness.
Primary and secondary school desegregation litigation will inevitably
be affected by the Supreme Court's decision in 2003 that racial diversity
is a compelling government interest for a state university to consider in
its admissions.176 Along with a broadened concept of equal educational
in ConstitutionalStruggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1546 (2004).

172. HARBAUGH, supra note 5, at 495 (quoting the lawyer who argued for South
Carolina in Brown).
173. Michael J. Bamshad & Steve E. Olson, Does Race Exist?, 289 Sc1. AM. 78,
80-81 (Dec. 2003); see also Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Placefor "Race" as a Legal
Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2005).
174. HORWITZ, supra note 170, at 253-54.
175. Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic
Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1342-54 (2004); Sabel &
Simon, supranote 26, at 1023-28; Thomas, supra note 28, at 1635-36.
176. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see Parker, Connecting the Dots,
supra note 28, at 1739-45 (comparing affirmative action's notion of deference with
school desegregation's allowance of local control); Id. at 1760-67 (discussing
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opportunity, a judge's consideration may extend to students' parents'
income in crafting attendance zones, transportation plans, and magnet
schools. 177 In the words of Kafka's priest, the Court's substantive
premise of diversity in affirmative action will "gradually merge" into the
solutions for K-12 school desegregation.
C. Substance, Remedy, and Discretion
Judges in our decentralized court system found it difficult to implement
Brown's substantive equal protection holding in practice because the
Supreme Court never clearly spelled out the principle. In the early
1970s, an Alabama school district's lawyer complained to me about the
Court's failure to explain what a "unitary" school was. "To this day,"
Professor Reva Siegel wrote in 2004, "equal protection law remains
unclear about the nature of the harm it is rectifying and the values it is
vindicating."1' 78 As a consequence of the Court's lack of substantive
leadership, direction and guidance, the trial judges had no single plan or
program and not much coordination.
The judge's remedial enterprise differs from his substantive
decisionmaking. The successful plaintiffs' remedy differs from their
right. The judge's remedy, while differing from the plaintiffs' right,
nevertheless ought to vindicate their right. 179 The judge should convert
an abstract substantive principle into a concrete solution consistent, or, at
least, not inconsistent, with the principle.
"All deliberate speed" was a remedial, not a substantive, principle, and
it was a wrongheaded principle at that. Many school-desegregation
injunctions were remedies delayed, too delayed in retrospect; an
injunction often left the plaintiffs far short of where they would have
been had the defendant never violated the constitution and thwarted
plaintiffs' constitutional rights to desegregated schools.
The Milliken or single-district injunction was a myopic, excessively
constraining, remedial principle. 80 The Court later modified the concept
of a "unitary" school district from an undefined goal into an imprecise
exit strategy without ever articulating principled intermediate standards
18
to channel discretion away from improper and subjective considerations. 1
desegregation's lessons for affirmative action); see also Robert A. Sedler, Affirmative
Action, Race, and the Constitution: From Bakke to Grutter, 92 Ky. L.J. 219, 220-23
(2003).
177. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioningthe Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 56-77 (2003).
178. Siegel, supranote 171, at 1546.
179. Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,1(1989).
180. Milliken 1,418 U.S. 717, 744-46 (1974), aff'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
181. See supra Part V.
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Several factors appear to be at work in the courts' transitional
jurisprudence. The judge's efforts must occur within the framework of
federalism and separation of powers. The perplexing logistics of hacking
through hundreds of complex bureaucratic systems was another factor.
That many of the systems' authorities were hostile beyond obdurate
"foot-dragging" was another. 182 Some judges may have adduced the
countervailing considerations to mask their hostility, lack of resolve, or
fear of the segregationist opposition and exercised their inevitable
logistical discretion as a cloak for lack of sympathy with the substantive
goals.
As mentioned above, Professor Birks suggested that legal taxonomists
ought to abandon or downgrade the concept of remedy as something
separate from the plaintiffs substantive right.' 83 Casting remedy overboard
would be a mistake.
The judge's substantive and remedial tasks diverge enough to justify
discrete remedies principles. The judge's remedial tasks must, however,
respond to Professor Birks's more general point. The remedies principles
and standards ought to be correct principles that serve substantive goals
and policy justifications. This Article has singled out three actually or
potentially unsound remedies principles that circumscribe plaintiffs'
remedy to less than their substantive entitlement: "all deliberate speed,"
single-district injunctions, and the unitary exit strategy. I hope that in
confinement to
addition this Article has adduced principles of remedial 184
dispel Birks's nightmare of "discretionary remedialism."'
Our constitution sets aside many individual rights to protect them
from ordinary majority measures; a court will administer the constitution
to protect those individual rights, usually granting the plaintiff a
preventive injunction to protect the plaintiffs constitutional claims.
When a legislature enacts or an executive executes an unconstitutional
positive law decision, a court will undertake judicial review and nullify
the improper law to achieve or to preserve a plaintiffs constitutional
right. 8 Next the judge will implement judicial review with a constitutional
injunction-the judge's principal remedy to construct for the plaintiff

182.
183.

See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.

184.

Birks, supra note 22, at 23.

185.

For a spirited defense of judicial review, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Faith:

America Without Judicial Review?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1416, 1416-17 (2000) (reviewing MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999)).
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and the public a practical world where the plaintiffs' constitutional
principle is not thwarted. The courts' inevitable logistics of transition
and implementation will accompany every shift from unconstitutional to
constitutional. Every U.S. court that annuls a state or local provision must
attend to federalism and separation of powers considerations. Official
school segregation was a large scale faulty decision built on slavery and
Jim Crow; judges had to grant large scale, even structural, injunctions
for a remedy. Official educational discrimination had taken a long time
to develop. It will take courts, legislatures, and other educators a long
time to disassemble it and to attend to its bad consequences.
Most people idealize decisions about future projects. "We are all
overly optimistic about completion times," writes management professor
Allen Bluedorn, "and we are so most of the time. This characteristic is
called the planning fallacy., 186 Anyone who has remodeled an old house
knows from "experience" that when you start something complex, you
don't know what problems you will encounter before you "finish."
"Law," wrote Professor Kevin Crotty, "isnot a rational system that
possesses some specified excellences; instead, the values animating a
legal system are a destabilizing feature, a principle of movement
187
ensuring that law never stops in a single place."
Perhaps W.E.B. DuBois knew more than he said when, as quoted
above, he underestimated "the color line" as a problem for the "twentieth
century." For had he told the whole truth then, the task may have been
too daunting to begin. Fifty years after Brown II we should be grateful
for the justices' collective naive idealism. A Court more realistic about
the logistical difficulties and the segregationists' hostility that militated
against prompt desegregation might have been too intimidated to start.
A contemporary observer should credit the Court for the optimism to
launch the venture. Quoting Justice Tom Clark, Professor (now Judge)
Wilkinson described the Court's remedial doctrines as growing "in small
individual steps, 'like Topsy,' with no grand design."' 188 In retrospect,
the Brown II Court initiated a remedial process; the plaintiffs, the
defendants, and the judges followed common law case-by-case
constitutional decisionmaking. Everyone muddled through.

186.

ALLEN

C.

BLUEDORN,

THE HUMAN

ORGANIZATION

OF TIME:

TEMPORAL

REALITIES AND EXPERIENCE 215 (2002). Bluedom observes that people are more
optimistic about their own than about others' completion times. Id. Remanding the

lawsuits to their respective trial judges is incongruous with the speculation that the
justices may have thought their Court could effect the needed changes.
187.
KEvIN M. CROTTY,LAW'S INTERIOR: LEGAL AND LITERARY CONSTRUCTIONS OF
THE SELF 144 (2001).
188.
WILKINSON, supra note 33, at 101.
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VII. A SHORT CONCLUSION

A Golden Anniversary summons our respect for an institution's
survival and our veneration for its strength and endurance. People
celebrating a major ritual, however, often ignore embarrassing,
inconvenient, or incongruous details as they sweep unfinished business
under the rug.
A midlife crisis, on the other hand, may occur about the same time,
that is during or at the end of a fifth decade. Typically someone
approaching this crossroads appraises his past critically, observes his
successes skeptically, agonizes about his incorrect decisions that are in
retrospect irrevocable, and seeks to deflect his trajectory toward a more
fulfilling target.
Brown is an ideal-"and like most ideals," said Professor Richard
Ford, "its merit is not that it is readily achieved, but that it is worth
struggling for." 189 That my modest effort on Brown II's fiftieth anniversary
commemorates rather than celebrates it and describes its midlife crisis
rather than its golden anniversary is an inevitable part of this optimistic
remedial realist's idea that law is never finished.

189.

Ford, supra note 77, at 1333.
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